Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Choices and Turning Points

Pakistan’s nuclear weapon decision-making apparatus, comprising the military and the civil bureaucracy i.e. included nuclear scientists, secretaries in authorities all.

In 1990’s Pakistan’s nuclear program working secretly but the decision making authorities confused due to tussle in the Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan region. Pakistan’s policymakers have three choices:- To adopt an overt nuclear weapons posture, to maintain the new status quo overt but without opting for deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery system and last option, to roll back the nuclear weapons program and accept the international non-proliferation regime.

In Pakistan ’s nuclear program with an overt nuclear program after 1998’s Indian Pokharan II test, this option carried on further domestic, regional and international variables.

In Domestic variable, Pakistan has a weak representative govt., direct or indirect authoritarian rule and an inept, divided political leadership. These factors provide a chance to military and its traditional stand towards Indian centric sentiments. This leads a constant increase in Military’s defence preparedness budget as well as for nuclear arsenals development project also.

In 1957, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established to train nuclear scientists and to set up a nuclear research reactor. 1965, Indo-Pak war was a turning point for both India and Pakistan’s nuclear program. For India, China blackmailed India for a two-front war, which was a direct threat to India’s national interests. For Pakistan, defeat in spreading insurgency in the Kashmir and second in the direct war with India.

Pakistan did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty(1968) because of growing support within policy-making circles of Pakistan for a nuclear weapon capability. After Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war which divided East Pakistan as a new country Bangladesh. This made Pakistan more offensive, the military use of nuclear power became the focal point of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. In March 1972, Pakistan’s PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with the support of the military and the civil bureaucracy, he adopted an aggressive nuclear program. Pak Further increased its activities after India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, as a turning point.

In 1976, Nuclear deal with France, Pakistani govt. claimed that it intended to set-up a large number of nuclear power plants to help Pak meet its energy needs. But this deal generates the Pak’s nuclear apparatus. In August 1976, Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in an effort to a complaint about this but failed. In 1996, Pakistan not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) also by following the footprints of India. 

After a breakthrough in Pak’s Nuclear program. Last turning point is the Indian Nuclear tests in 11 and 13 May 1998 and further Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in 29 and 30 May 1998.      

Why states build Nuclear Weapons? - Conditions & Levels

This is a review of "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" the essay written by Scot D Sagan.
Scot D. Sagan in his paper, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” in the following paper writer developed a conceptual work for predicting the long-term future aspect of nuclear security and for contemporary foreign policy efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There are two main conditions in nuclear security; first, if there is a threat then there will be nuclearization response, only alternative means to tackle or counter his adversary nation. The second, If they don’t have any threat then they can’t go to nuclear proliferation. But these two aspects are not the only ways to go to proliferation or not, there are many other ways also.

In three levels, why do states build nuclear weapons? The first level is the Security level in which a state develop nuclear arsenals as a constituent of national security against the international threat from a rival nation to balance its threat as a nuclear deterrent. Not every nation have capability or resources to build nuclear weapons; those who have enough resources to build nuclear weapons internally but investing huge amount of money and resources is necessary to build, but those nations which do not have enough resources to build nuclear weapons then they go with the alliances with strong nations and comes under the nuclear umbrella of strong nations.
 Strong nations use this nuclear deterrence by two ways; against overwhelming conventional military threats and as a coercive tool to compel changes in the existing global order e.g. India and Pakistan did in 1998 in the Asian subcontinent. Another example is South Africa developed covertly small nuclear arsenals during the Soviets invasion in Angola that creates a fear of invasion in South African mind due to this they went to nuclear but after Soviets split in 1989, in 1991 South Africa destroyed all nuclear arsenals on the other side during the 1960s due to increasing tensions between Sino-Russia, China goes to nuclear in 1964 but after de-escalating tensions it didn’t destroy its arsenals. So this raises a question, Is it a threat from an adversary only reason to go to nuclearization? The answer is not there are two other levels also.

The second level is the domestic politics model that is defining about the nuclear pork and parochial interests of all the three lobbies present domestically within a state i.e. the states nuclear energy establishment includes officials in state running nuclear laboratories and civilian reactors, important units within the professional army, air force and navy especially those who have role in nuclear propulsion, third lobby is of politicians in states by mass mobilization in the name of national security for gaining popularity. Example of bureaucratic, political and the social construction of technically concerning military procurements in the US and Soviet Union during the cold war era shows a strong nexus of the Scientific-Military-Industrial complex within both the countries. In 1974, before and after the first nuclear test a bureaucratic and scientific nexus of those who oppose the test or who contesting for test presents. In the Indian case, the military and foreign office were not asked how nuclear weapons would affect their war plans and military doctrines, only analysis of political goals of the test, not long time military and foreign policy implications.

There are policy implications of the domestic politics model also creates many hurdles in the proliferation and non- proliferation both ,implications are during cold war and in contemporary time, the influence of the US-led non-proliferation policy to have less effect due to supremacy of domestic politics, the US started using IMF and other financial institutions to start pressurizing the states to cut military expenditure, this creates a negative impact over states against the US-led non-proliferation as a breach in its sovereignty, economic as well as environmental cost of nuclear weapons highlights the risks of nuclear accidents and last one is diversifying the mind of military professionals from nuclear to other things just like in UN Peace Keeping operations.

Two other institutional implications, first one is the negative role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on supporter or those who have keen to be nuclearized in future in domestic level . Second implication is IAEA’s monitoring capabilities and enforcement incentives against the unregulated activities within a state’s own nuclear organizations. They are not ready to surrender their organizations of national security against any other institution.

The third level is the Norms model that shows the nuclear weapons as a symbol of states identity. In this global order, states identity not shown by its leader's behaviour but by its military and national security measures. It is determined by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions legitimate and appropriate in international relations. The Norms model suggested a new institutionalism is necessary for modern era because here institutions mimic each other e.g. Air Marawi and Royal Nepal airlines not for the profit but for the showing of new institutionalism or modern against old one. Nuclear weapons showing as a symbol of modernity. There are many implications in this model; the first one if the US has First Use Policy and it also leads a nuclear non-proliferation, it is not acceptable by the non-nuclear nations. The second implication, India, Japan and Germany does not have Nuclear nation tag but India has nuclear weapons that not mean they are not modern. These nations have prestige as P5 nations have.

In conclusion, the ideas presented here in favour of the security model, if P5 nations have a foreign threat. They developed nuclear arsenals then why not in future Iran, Iraq, Libya. They also have a threat. If we considering domestic politics model, many nations have aspirations to build up nuclear arsenals but they don’t have resources and in last norms model, why not South Korea and Japan building nuclear arsenals if it is a symbol of modernity. Not all of the models applied in any one nuclear proliferation but they can in individual proliferations. 

These three levels applied on all nuclear weapon states instead of having geographical, political, economic and military proximities.

Keywords; Nuclear proliferation, Security, Institutions, Domestic, Models.

Shubham Rai is doing his Masters in Peace and Conflict studies at Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi. He has also earned a bachelors degree in  Defence studies from Agra University. Shubham has a deep interest in the subject of Security and Nuclear studies.