Pulwama Terrorist Attack and Reliability of Nuclear Deterrence

After the Pulwama attack, Pakistani strategic commentators are constantly raising the question of nuclear deterrence reliability within the South Asian region. They understand this but they are ignoring India’s nature of nuclear doctrine. Ayesha Siddiqa has stated regarding nuclear deterrence and the limits of it while using against Pakistan. Can India think about destroying the Jaish’s HQ 200 mile far from LoC? It is possible but covertly.

Before we go through the strategic depth of India’s nuclear doctrine, we need to look into the historical background of Pakistan’s nuclear build up. Pakistan nuclear policy has been India centric, revolving around perceptions of threat and hostility from India. The fundamental aim of its nuclear weapons program is to avoid a repetition of the defeat of 1971.  The 1971 war was not only a conventional defeat for Pakistan but also resulted in the reduction of its territory. It posed a serious threat to its survival as a state. The second aim is to deterring India not to retaliate by conventional means during terror attacks. Pakistan’s Information and Technology Minister later Wazir-e-Azam Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remarked in 1965 that, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves- even go hungry but we will get one of our own.”  Before this Pakistan had started its nuclear research program in 1957. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established to train nuclear scientists and to set up a nuclear reactor. The 1965 and 1971 defeats accelerated the urge to use nuclear power for military purposes. Pakistan further intensified its nuclear activities after India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, as a turning point.

Pakistan adopted the catalytic posture during the first phase of its nuclear weaponization from the 1980s to 1991. Optimization theory laid that due to the presence of a reliable third party as a patron i.e. the US, Pakistan would adopt a catalytic posture. Since 1979, the US policy towards Pakistan has been of a helping hand to counter the USSR’s presence in Afghanistan. In this period, the US assured the security of Pakistan from external threats. However, after the loss of the momentum in the bilateral relationship, the US umbrella started lifting. Due to this reason, Pakistan tested its first Atomic bomb on 30 May 1998 at Chagai Hills just after Indian tests on 11 and 13 May at Pokhran.  

After the 1998 test, Pakistan changed its nuclear posture overtly as an asymmetric escalation posture. In 1999 Kargil war failure showed again the superiority of Indian conventional forces. This again created a precarious security environment for Pakistan, which lead to a change in the posture. Pakistan decided to follow the First Use of the nuclear weapons and this posture required the delegative command and control system i.e. in this more power were given in the hands of the military officers or commanding officers than civilian political authorities. The delegative C&C system creates possibilities of inadvertent use of these weapons. The state’s domestic structure of civil-military relations best suited to this posture in Pakistan. The rationalist thing is the use of resources available in the country either they use in the development of civilian authority or in this posture. This posture needs more resources as compared to other posture i.e. eating grass and making atomic bombs. The security threats in the strategist’s mind in Pakistan with AEP posture leading a vertical proliferation of the nuclear weapons within Pakistan more than enough to deter India.    

India’s Nuclear doctrine providing a safe and internationally accepted stand of No First Use with Mutually Assured Retaliation. This doctrine has the capability of the second strike with punitive action. In this doctrine, the question of unpredictability is inclusive, if India has reliable intelligence of the first strike then it should strike first. India already has counter-force capability towards Pakistan and counter-value capability towards China. Counterforce capability provides India will to destroy the Pakistani arsenals before they launch it. It includes Brahmos Ballistic Missiles have the speed of nearby speed of sound. Brahmos should also be destroyed Lahore theatre of NASR missile of Battle Field Nuclear weapons of Pakistan. So there is no reason to deter to take any decision which is necessary or in the interest of the country. 

Vertical Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

The Case of China:

China’s strategic culture provides a depth in security and foreign policy framing. China fought many wars against imperialistic powers on its eastern front. These wars create an offences stance in the Chinese minds. After becoming the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao and the others within the Chinese leadership viewed the strength of nuclear weapons as a psychologically strong weapon as deterrence more than as a full-fledged weapon used in a war (Lewis 2007). Due to this reason, they build warheads in the minimum numbers for deterrence and policy of No- First Use declared. According to the posture optimization theory, China declared Assured retaliation posture with a triad capability to secure its nuclear arsenals during the first strike and after that retaliation is very hard to the enemy. This retaliation provides the capability of nuclear deterrence in the enemy’s mind.

China maintained full secrecy in its nuclear program since the 1950s. China tested its first nuclear warhead in 1964 at Lopnor, for showing its nuclear capabilities to its rival nations. During the cold war period especially in the 1970s and 1980s China facing a conventional threat from both the superpowers the US and the USSR. Instead of having conventional inferior as compare to enemies China not adopted asymmetric escalation posture (AEP) because of its civil-military arrangements which are in this case related to the Communist Party of China. In the party structure and state structure China ruled by a single party, which have full legitimacy to use coercive means for the security of their citizens and for their welfare. These reasons provided a base why China adopted the assertive command and control system, here political party have control over the nuclear arsenals C&C system. China adopted assured retaliation posture (ARP) in the 1980s to till because it invested its resources more on economic infrastructural development. This posture needs fewer resources as compare to other ones. The posture choices by a state also depend on the pattern of conflicts among states. Here in the case of China, demands a nuclear posture to deter conflict better than others. A state with nuclear arsenals is less effective than its posture, ARP provides a deterrence strategy over the enemy by assured retaliation in case of First Strike.

After the disintegration of the USSR, China faces security challenges from the US only. In competition with the US, China started its posture and proliferation of arsenals according to changes in the US arsenals (Sagan 1996-1997). The US perfects its missile systems and highly precise long-range conventional strike systems that would render the Chinese second strike capabilities less credible, China either revise its posture or go to the arms race with the US. Chinese strategists are worried about the potential effect of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) on the survivability of Chinese second strike capabilities, this step of the US is escalators and highly inimical to their conceptions of strategic stability (Saalman 2011).  

       

The Case of Pakistan: -   

Pakistan follows a nuclear policy has been India centric, revolving around perceptions of threat from and hostility towards India. The fundamental aim of its nuclear weapons program is to avoid a repetition of the defeat of 1971. Which is not only a conventional defeat for Pakistan but also reduction of its territory and threat to its survival as a state. Pakistan’s Information and Technology Minister later Wazir-e-Azam Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remarked in 1965 that, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves- even go hungry but we will get one of our own” (Khan 2012).  Before this Pakistan started its nuclear research program in 1957, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established to train nuclear scientists and to set up a nuclear research reactor. But 1965 and 1971 defeats accelerate the military use of nuclear power. Pakistan further increased its activities after India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, as a turning point (Ahmed 1999).

Pakistan adopted the catalytic posture during the first phase of its nuclear weaponization from the 1980s to 1991. Optimization theory laid that due to the presence of a reliable third party as a patron i.e. the US, Pakistan would adopt a catalytic posture. Since 1979, the US policy towards Pakistan as a helping hand to counter the USSR’s presence in Afghanistan. In this period, the US stated many times to assure the security of Pakistan from external threats. However, after the loss of the moment, the US umbrella started lifting. Due to this reason, Pakistan tested its first Atomic bomb on 30 May at Chagai Hills just after Indian tests on 11 and 13 May at Pokhran.  

After the 1998 test, Pakistan changed its nuclear posture overtly as asymmetric escalation posture. In 1999 Kargil war failure shows again the superiority of Indian conventional forces. This again creates a precarious security environment for Pakistan, which lead to a change in the posture (Ditmer 2001). In this posture, States go with the First Use of the nuclear weapons and posture requires the delegative command and control system i.e. in this more power in the hand of the military officers or commanding officers than civilian political authorities. The delegative C&C system creates possibilities of inadvertent use of these weapons. The state’s domestic structure of civil-military relations best suited to this posture in Pakistan. The rationalist thing is the use of resources available in the country either they use in the development of civilian authority or in this posture. (Ahmed 1999) This posture needs more resources as compared to other posture i.e. eating grass and making atomic bombs. The security threats in the strategist’s mind in Pakistan with AEP posture leading a vertical proliferation of the nuclear weapons within Pakistan more than enough to deter India.    

    The Case of India: -

India’s Nuclear doctrine, not a Pakistan centric doctrine. After independence, Indian leadership not in the favours of strategic use of nuclear technology but their focus on civil-nuclear energy purpose. Indian perception changed with changing regional security dynamics in South Asia. In the 1962 Sino-Indian war, 1964 Chinese atomic bomb test, and the 1965 Indo-Pak war with a threat of double front war changed the Indian strategists' mindset (Kennedy 2011).

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s decision to go Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 changed the policies to see nuclear technology not only as civil nuclear energy purposes but also as a strategic nuclear weapon. After 1998, Pokhran II test, India officially declared its doctrine of No First Use but the nuclear posture of Assured retaliation (ARP).  India opted this posture because of the nature of regional security architecture of the region i.e. conventional superiority over Pakistan, conventional forces balance but natural geographic barriers buffering it against China’s land forces don’t demand a first use posture to deter any threatening conventional power (Ganguly 1999). The relatively fast modernization of India’s arsenals to achieve a nuclear triad which is necessary for the assured retaliation posture. For improving nuclear triad, India successfully tested nuclear-capable K-4 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and a supersonic interceptor missile to have a full-fledged and multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in the April-May 2016 respectively (The Hindu 2016). These steps of India, not for a arms race but for the assurance of its posture. Pakistan was also alarmed with this type of nuclear and missile system advancement of India, which led to instability and arms race in the region.

This paper is an abstract from my paper on Vertical Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Under Posture Optimisation Theory.

Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Choices and Turning Points

Pakistan’s nuclear weapon decision-making apparatus, comprising the military and the civil bureaucracy i.e. included nuclear scientists, secretaries in authorities all.

In 1990’s Pakistan’s nuclear program working secretly but the decision making authorities confused due to tussle in the Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan region. Pakistan’s policymakers have three choices:- To adopt an overt nuclear weapons posture, to maintain the new status quo overt but without opting for deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery system and last option, to roll back the nuclear weapons program and accept the international non-proliferation regime.

In Pakistan ’s nuclear program with an overt nuclear program after 1998’s Indian Pokharan II test, this option carried on further domestic, regional and international variables.

In Domestic variable, Pakistan has a weak representative govt., direct or indirect authoritarian rule and an inept, divided political leadership. These factors provide a chance to military and its traditional stand towards Indian centric sentiments. This leads a constant increase in Military’s defence preparedness budget as well as for nuclear arsenals development project also.

In 1957, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established to train nuclear scientists and to set up a nuclear research reactor. 1965, Indo-Pak war was a turning point for both India and Pakistan’s nuclear program. For India, China blackmailed India for a two-front war, which was a direct threat to India’s national interests. For Pakistan, defeat in spreading insurgency in the Kashmir and second in the direct war with India.

Pakistan did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty(1968) because of growing support within policy-making circles of Pakistan for a nuclear weapon capability. After Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war which divided East Pakistan as a new country Bangladesh. This made Pakistan more offensive, the military use of nuclear power became the focal point of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. In March 1972, Pakistan’s PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with the support of the military and the civil bureaucracy, he adopted an aggressive nuclear program. Pak Further increased its activities after India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, as a turning point.

In 1976, Nuclear deal with France, Pakistani govt. claimed that it intended to set-up a large number of nuclear power plants to help Pak meet its energy needs. But this deal generates the Pak’s nuclear apparatus. In August 1976, Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in an effort to a complaint about this but failed. In 1996, Pakistan not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) also by following the footprints of India. 

After a breakthrough in Pak’s Nuclear program. Last turning point is the Indian Nuclear tests in 11 and 13 May 1998 and further Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in 29 and 30 May 1998.      

Why states build Nuclear Weapons? - Conditions & Levels

This is a review of "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" the essay written by Scot D Sagan.
Scot D. Sagan in his paper, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” in the following paper writer developed a conceptual work for predicting the long-term future aspect of nuclear security and for contemporary foreign policy efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There are two main conditions in nuclear security; first, if there is a threat then there will be nuclearization response, only alternative means to tackle or counter his adversary nation. The second, If they don’t have any threat then they can’t go to nuclear proliferation. But these two aspects are not the only ways to go to proliferation or not, there are many other ways also.

In three levels, why do states build nuclear weapons? The first level is the Security level in which a state develop nuclear arsenals as a constituent of national security against the international threat from a rival nation to balance its threat as a nuclear deterrent. Not every nation have capability or resources to build nuclear weapons; those who have enough resources to build nuclear weapons internally but investing huge amount of money and resources is necessary to build, but those nations which do not have enough resources to build nuclear weapons then they go with the alliances with strong nations and comes under the nuclear umbrella of strong nations.
 Strong nations use this nuclear deterrence by two ways; against overwhelming conventional military threats and as a coercive tool to compel changes in the existing global order e.g. India and Pakistan did in 1998 in the Asian subcontinent. Another example is South Africa developed covertly small nuclear arsenals during the Soviets invasion in Angola that creates a fear of invasion in South African mind due to this they went to nuclear but after Soviets split in 1989, in 1991 South Africa destroyed all nuclear arsenals on the other side during the 1960s due to increasing tensions between Sino-Russia, China goes to nuclear in 1964 but after de-escalating tensions it didn’t destroy its arsenals. So this raises a question, Is it a threat from an adversary only reason to go to nuclearization? The answer is not there are two other levels also.

The second level is the domestic politics model that is defining about the nuclear pork and parochial interests of all the three lobbies present domestically within a state i.e. the states nuclear energy establishment includes officials in state running nuclear laboratories and civilian reactors, important units within the professional army, air force and navy especially those who have role in nuclear propulsion, third lobby is of politicians in states by mass mobilization in the name of national security for gaining popularity. Example of bureaucratic, political and the social construction of technically concerning military procurements in the US and Soviet Union during the cold war era shows a strong nexus of the Scientific-Military-Industrial complex within both the countries. In 1974, before and after the first nuclear test a bureaucratic and scientific nexus of those who oppose the test or who contesting for test presents. In the Indian case, the military and foreign office were not asked how nuclear weapons would affect their war plans and military doctrines, only analysis of political goals of the test, not long time military and foreign policy implications.

There are policy implications of the domestic politics model also creates many hurdles in the proliferation and non- proliferation both ,implications are during cold war and in contemporary time, the influence of the US-led non-proliferation policy to have less effect due to supremacy of domestic politics, the US started using IMF and other financial institutions to start pressurizing the states to cut military expenditure, this creates a negative impact over states against the US-led non-proliferation as a breach in its sovereignty, economic as well as environmental cost of nuclear weapons highlights the risks of nuclear accidents and last one is diversifying the mind of military professionals from nuclear to other things just like in UN Peace Keeping operations.

Two other institutional implications, first one is the negative role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on supporter or those who have keen to be nuclearized in future in domestic level . Second implication is IAEA’s monitoring capabilities and enforcement incentives against the unregulated activities within a state’s own nuclear organizations. They are not ready to surrender their organizations of national security against any other institution.

The third level is the Norms model that shows the nuclear weapons as a symbol of states identity. In this global order, states identity not shown by its leader's behaviour but by its military and national security measures. It is determined by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions legitimate and appropriate in international relations. The Norms model suggested a new institutionalism is necessary for modern era because here institutions mimic each other e.g. Air Marawi and Royal Nepal airlines not for the profit but for the showing of new institutionalism or modern against old one. Nuclear weapons showing as a symbol of modernity. There are many implications in this model; the first one if the US has First Use Policy and it also leads a nuclear non-proliferation, it is not acceptable by the non-nuclear nations. The second implication, India, Japan and Germany does not have Nuclear nation tag but India has nuclear weapons that not mean they are not modern. These nations have prestige as P5 nations have.

In conclusion, the ideas presented here in favour of the security model, if P5 nations have a foreign threat. They developed nuclear arsenals then why not in future Iran, Iraq, Libya. They also have a threat. If we considering domestic politics model, many nations have aspirations to build up nuclear arsenals but they don’t have resources and in last norms model, why not South Korea and Japan building nuclear arsenals if it is a symbol of modernity. Not all of the models applied in any one nuclear proliferation but they can in individual proliferations. 

These three levels applied on all nuclear weapon states instead of having geographical, political, economic and military proximities.

Keywords; Nuclear proliferation, Security, Institutions, Domestic, Models.

Shubham Rai is doing his Masters in Peace and Conflict studies at Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi. He has also earned a bachelors degree in  Defence studies from Agra University. Shubham has a deep interest in the subject of Security and Nuclear studies.